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INTRODUCTION
W
hile the oceans are mostly out of sight, and therefore
mostly out of mind, they make up the majority of our
environment.1 They are a place where industrial food
production relies on hunting rather than farming. But industrial
food production relies on industrial equipment such as massive
bottom trawl nets and scallop dredges that scrape across the
seafloor. The use of these destructive tools has been compared to
using bulldozers for hunting squirrels in the forest.2 The result-
ing impact is comparable to clear-cutting forests — but could be
far more devastating.3 In 1998, scientists estimated that every
two years, destructive trawlers sweep an area equivalent to the
entire world’s continental shelf.4 This article examines one route
among many leading to the goal of conserving marine habitat:
using the statutory mandate directing regional fishery manage-
ment councils to protect essential fish habitat (“EFH”). 
CONGRESS PUTS HABITAT INTO THE
MAGNUSON-STEVENS ACT
When Congress enacted the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery
Conservation and Management Act in 1976, conservation was
not the concern. Congress wanted to “Americanize the fish-
eries,” by kicking foreign fishing vessels out of United States
waters.5 To regulate the newly Americanized fisheries, the Act
created eight regional fishery management councils composed
of fisheries stakeholders.6 The regional councils develop fishery
management plans and implementing regulations to manage the
fisheries.7 These plans and regulations are subject to only limited
federal oversight — the National Marine Fisheries Service may
disapprove a plan or regulation if it finds that the measure vio-
lates the law.8
From the beginning, the Magnuson-Stevens Act gave coun-
cils the authority to “designate zones where, and periods when,
fishing shall be limited, or shall not be permitted, or shall be per-
mitted only by specified types of fishing vessels or with specified
types and quantities of fishing gear.”9 This authority granted to
the councils all the power that they needed to protect marine
habitat. A council could prohibit all fishing in a sensitive habitat
zone or forbid all destructive fishing gears from fishing in that
zone. But most councils stood idle as the threat from destructive
trawling and other destructive fishing gear became apparent over
the years.10
From 1976 to 1996, the councils and the federal govern-
ment, aided and abetted by the fishing community, embarked on
an erratic series of policies that forced the marine ecosystem and
fishing communities through a cycle of environmental and eco-
nomic boom and bust.11 First, government subsidies would bloat
fishing capacity to an unsustainable level, after which regula-
tions would belatedly, but abruptly, pull the plug on fishing, leav-
ing environmental and economic chaos in their wake.12 By 1994,
with the collapse of the New England groundfish fishery,13
reform was politically possible.
Two years later, in October 1996, Congress enacted the Sus-
tainable Fisheries Act Amendments of 1996 to the Magnuson-
Stevens Act (“SFA”).14 The amendments required, inter alia,
that the regional councils incorporate habitat conservation meas-
ures into their fishery management plans.15 The intent of Con-
gress seemed plain, to take the “may protect habitat” already in
the Magnuson-Stevens Act, and change it to a “must.” 
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OVERDUE GUIDANCE IGNORED BY
REGIONAL COUNCILS
THE FISHERIES SERVICE PROVIDES GUIDANCE
While the habitat provisions of the bill appeared strong,
vague language and lack of institutional reform sowed the seeds
of future problems. First, the bill protected EFH from “adverse
effects,” but did not define the term. Second, the bill qualified its
mandate, directing councils to “minimize” adverse effects “to
the extent practicable,” without explaining what “minimize” or
“practicable” meant. Third, and most damaging, the bill gave the
task of protecting habitat to the very institutions that had not
done it in the past: the regional councils.
Nevertheless, the law mandated actions and set deadlines. It
required the Fisheries Service to issue EFH guidance within six
months of enactment.16 In addition, the SFA required the Fish-
eries Service to provide specific EFH information and recom-
mendations to each council.17 The SFA also required the
councils to amend their fishery management plans within 24
months to designate and protect EFH.18
The Fisheries Service
termed its guidance, issued half
a year late, an “interim final
rule.”19 The interim guidance
spoke directly to the key issues
identified above. It broadly inter-
preted the term “adverse effect”
to include “any impact which
reduces quality and/or quantity
of EFH.”20 The definition made
clear that “adverse effects”
included direct physical disrup-
tion to habitat21 — seemingly
guaranteeing that destructive
trawling and dredging would be
deemed to have adverse effects.
In addition, the interim guidance included a completely
unhelpful, if not actively counter-productive, discussion of the
term “practicable.”22 The Fisheries Service advised that in con-
sidering practicability, councils should consider the adverse
effects of the fishing activity, the long and short-term costs to the
fishery and its EFH, and other appropriate factors, including the
statutory command that regulations should, where “practicable,”
minimize costs and unnecessary duplication.23 Thus, the agency
told the councils to consider everything, but provided no guid-
ance on how to make a decision. 
To further fulfill its mandate to provide guidance to the
councils, the agency commissioned a review of the scientific lit-
erature on the effects of fishing gear on habitat.24 The review
found that “[f]ishing is one of the most widespread human
impacts to the marine environment.”25 More disturbingly, the
study also found that “systems are being fished to the point
where recovery is delayed so long that the economic conse-
quences are devastating.”26 We are currently seeing this pattern
in many fisheries around the world. Mindful of the eventual eco-
nomic and ecological cost of destroying the habitat on which
commercial fishing depends, the review advised that “managers
bear the responsibility of adopting a precautionary approach
when considering the environmental consequences of fishing
rather than assuming that the extraction of fish has no ecological
price and therefore no feedback loop to our non-ecologically
based economic system.”27
THE COUNCILS DENY ADVERSE EFFECTS
While the Fisheries Service was initially responsive to the
Congressional mandate, the regional councils rejected it. One
council contended that it had already addressed all habitat prob-
lems and refused to take any new steps.28 Two other councils
determined that they would defer actually protecting habitat to
the future, rather than complying with the Congressional 24-
month deadline.29 None of the six councils that had neglected
habitat in the past adopted new management measures in
response to the new legislative command.30 In an interesting
twist, even though the interim guidance contained a strong defi-
nition of “adverse effect” and a weak discussion of “practicabil-
ity,” the councils justified their
failure to promulgate new man-
agement measures by the
alleged inability to establish that
there were any adverse effects.31
The Fisheries Service
approved all but one of the
plainly deficient fishery man-
agement plan amendments sub-
mitted by the councils.32 Marine
conservation and fishing groups
filed suit concerning the five
regions where plans were
approved.33 In an initial blow to
the enforceability of the new
EFH provisions, the District
Court did not heed the indis-
putable evidence that destructive gears physically disrupt the
seafloor, causing adverse effects as defined by the interim guid-
ance.34 Instead, the District Court deferred to the council conclu-
sions that there was not enough evidence to determine the effects
of trawling and dredging on habitat.35 But the District Court did
not let the Government off the hook. Instead, it ruled that under
the National Environmental Policy Act, the Government was
required to develop the information necessary to determine
whether there were adverse effects.36 As a result of the ruling,
the Government agreed to develop environmental impact state-
ments (“EISs”) around the country to reevaluate protecting EFH
from fishing gear.37
IN THE INTERIM — THE COURTS PUNT
Neither fishing nor the issuance of new fisheries regulations
stopped while the EISs were under development. Conservation
groups brought cases concerning the Atlantic sea scallop fishery
and the golden tilefish fishery in the Mid-Atlantic to protect EFH
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afoul of the judicial reluctance to give weight to the crucial
words of the EFH provision.
The golden tilefish case, NRDC v. Evans, concerned the
impacts of destructive trawling on seafloor habitat, as golden
tilefish live in burrows in the seafloor,38 presenting an ideal
example of a species in need of protection. Moreover, there was
undisputed evidence that bottom trawls physically disrupted
seafloor habitat by plowing over tilefish burrows and by leaving
scars on the seafloor.39 Yet the Mid-Atlantic Council refused to
adopt any protective measures, arguing accurately that there was
no scientific study one way or another as to the impacts on tile-
fish of having their burrows buried.40 NRDC v. Evans thus
repeated on a smaller scale the argument in the initial EFH case
as to whether a showing of physical disruption, as specified in
the interim guidelines, was enough to show an adverse effect, or
whether courts could not act unless conservationists could pro-
duce scientific evidence linking impact on habitat to injury to a
commercially-fished species. This is what has been called the
“dead body” standard. The tilefish court followed AOC v. Daley
and adopted the “dead body” standard over the physical disrup-
tion standard found in the agency’s regulations.41 As a result, the
litigation route to establishing
adverse effects stalled.42
Conservation Law Founda-
tion v. U.S. Department of Com-
merce was the principal case
brought in the Atlantic sea scal-
lop fishery. It concerned a rule
governing scallop fishing for the
2001 and 2002 fishing sea-
sons.43 The New England Coun-
cil considered three options for
closing areas of the fishery to
allow scallops to mature.44 The
Council’s analysis ranked the
three options as to how well they protected EFH and evaluated
their short-term cost and long-term cost to the fishery.45 A clo-
sure in New England’s Great South Channel was ranked as hav-
ing the greatest benefit to habitat, the highest short-term cost,
but possibly the highest long-term benefit to the fishery.46 The
Council rejected that alternative.47 Given the analysis, the case
presented an opportunity to test the enforceability of the require-
ment to protect EFH “to the extent practicable.” Unfortunately,
the First Circuit declined to attribute any force to the practicabil-
ity requirement. Instead, the court declared: “We think by using
the term ‘practicable’ Congress intended rather to allow for the
application of agency expertise and discretion in determining
how best to manage fishery resources.”48
WINNING THE BATTLE ON ADVERSE EFFECTS
As the EISs and rulemakings recommenced, the councils
and the Fisheries Service revisited the issue of adverse effects.
This time, with relatively little struggle, the EISs documented
the scientific consensus that destructive trawling and dredging
adversely affect seafloor habitat. In fact, every single remand
EIS found adverse effects. 
Two events stand out. First, the Fisheries Service requested
the National Academy of Sciences to investigate the effects of
bottom trawling. The study unequivocally found adverse effects,
concluding, for example, that “[t]rawling and dredging change
the physical habitat and biologic structure of ecosystems and
therefore can have potentially wide-ranging consequences.”49
Second, the North Pacific Council stood alone in issuing a
draft EIS that refused to find adverse effects.50 But a peer-review
by independent scientists noted in polite academic language that
it “is premature to conclude that the current level and pattern of
fishing activity has minimal or temporary effects on the habitat
. . .” and that in any case, the draft EIS was “at odds,” with the
overall conclusion of the National Academy of Sciences
report.51 The peer review forced the North Pacific Council to
reverse course. It appears that adverse effects will no longer be a
battleground.
TRYING TO PROTECT HABITAT
THAT IS BEING FISHED
As mentioned earlier, the political impetus for the conserva-
tion reforms that established EFH came out of the collapse of the
New England groundfish fish-
ery. More than ten years later,
cod is still in severely bad shape.
Over the years, scientists have
thoroughly documented the
dependence of young cod on a
certain kind of rocky or gravelly
seafloor habitat with living
structure such as sponges.52 This
habitat is continually pounded
by destructive trawling. Oceana
and other conservation groups
vigorously worked to include
alternatives for protecting cod
habitat in the New England
EISs. Unfortunately, the political situation was not yet ripe. The
EISs did not take a scientific approach to identifying alterna-
tives, but instead only examined alternatives based on historical
closures enacted for other reasons.53 As a result, these alterna-
tives left most cod habitat unprotected. 
Eventually, the New England Council adopted one of the
alternatives — a small step forward in recognizing the necessity
of closures to protect habitat, but not enough to protect ground-
fish.54 Oceana sued, seeking to compel the Council to consider
more scientifically designed and more protective alternatives.55
The court denied the claims, relying heavily on the First Circuit’s
holding that the EFH provision gave the Government vast discre-
tion.56
But the process continues as the evidence grows and the
philosophy and composition of the councils evolve. The New
England Council is now seriously considering a proposal to pro-
tect juvenile cod EFH in the Great South Channel — the same
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FREEZING THE FOOTPRINT OF BOTTOM
TRAWLING: PROTECTING HABITAT THAT IS
NOT YET BEING FISHED
As the New England example shows, advocating that fisher-
men stay out of areas that they already fish is difficult. Advocates
with Oceana developed the innovative, although controversial,
idea of taking the path of least resistance.57 To understand the
new strategy, it is necessary to understand that fishing is not a
static activity. If one area is fished out because it is overex-
ploited, vessels explore and move to new areas.58 So although it
is very important to protect areas that are already subject to fish-
ing, it is also valuable to protect areas that no one is fishing yet.
Acting on this insight, Oceana and other conservation
groups in Alaska and the Pacific coast began gathering data on
where vessels fished, and where they did not. Their enterprise
was further bolstered by the discovery in 2001 of astonishingly
beautiful gardens of deep-sea coral off Alaska’s Aleutian
Islands.59 Conservation groups also identified other special areas
off Alaska and in the Pacific, including deep-sea underwater
mountains, or seamounts, that also supported special and beauti-
ful ecological communities. Proposals based on restricting the
expansion of destructive fishing and protecting special places
succeeded in protecting submarine canyons in the Atlantic,60
more than half a million square miles61 of marine habitat off the
Aleutian Islands62 and in the Pacific63. 
CONCLUSION
The work to protect marine habitat from destructive trawl-
ing continues. Oceana is developing a comprehensive approach
to halting the expansion of destructive trawling in the Atlantic.
In the meantime, Oceana is advancing specific proposals to pro-
tect more deep-sea canyons and seamounts to the New England
Council and Oceana is supporting the South Atlantic Council’s
development of a broad-based ecosystem management plan that
will protect areas of coral from North Carolina to Florida. 
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